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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
a rural area.5 1 For example, even in rural areas, foreseeability of
people being present during the hunting season will most likely dif-
fer from other times of the year. The import of the new rule is
that the jury may now decide these issues and they will not 1:
decided as a matter of law.52
To make the premises safe for the entrant, the occupier r.ust
sacrifice some interest in ownership of his land. 53 Under the O'7 ?ary
rule, the interest which must be sacrificed by the occupier is a
factor having new importance. The interest may be more or less
important, depending upon whether the premises is a store, or a
farm, or a person's home. For example, in both Sendelbach and
O'Leary, the plaintiff was bitten by a dog while on a farm, an ob-
viously important fact to consider in answering the question of
sacrifice, since dogs are useful on farms.
Although an increasing number of jurisdictions have abolished
the licensee-invitee distinction, they have not agreed on whether the
trespasser category should be maintained. Those jurisdictions which
have followed Rowland in abandoning all three categories have held
that they serve no useful function. 54 Other jurisdictions, including
North Dakota, consider the distinction between trespassers and those
who enter with consent so great that the abrogation of the rule as
to trespassers should not be considered. 55
It is reassuring to see that North Dakota has acknowledged the
trend favoring the abandonment of the common law categories, at
least as the sole determinative factor in cases where they arise. The
categories have long since outlived whatever useful function they
were designed for and their demise is welcomed.
MARK W. MORROW
INFANTS-CRIMES-YOUTHS SENTENCED UNDER FEDERAL YOUTH COR-
RECTIONS ACT MAY NOT BE CONFINED IN A CORRECTIONAL INSTITU-
TION WITH ADULT OFFENDERS
In 1975, petitioners were convicted of criminal acts and were
sentenced for treatment and supervision under the Federal Youth
51. Id.
52. Normally the status of the entrant will be an issue decided by the court. Werth v.
Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1972). In a case where the evidence is incon-
clusive, however, the jury is instructed as to the distinctions of the status involved and
are allowed to determine the status as a matter of fact. Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W.2d
496 (N.D. 1976).
53. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. 1977).
54. See supra note 33.
55. Mounsey v. Willard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973): O'Leary v. Coenen, 251
N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977) ; Antoniewicz v. Resczynski, 70 WVis. 2d 836, 236 NW.2d 1 (1975).
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Corrections Act (the Youth Act).' Upon being found amenable
to sentencing as youth offenders, 2 petitioners were ultimately con-
fined at the Federal Correctional Institution, Oxford, Wisconsin.3
Petitions were filed for writs of habeas corpus on the ground that
confinement of petitioners at Oxford was in violation of the provi-
sions of the Youth Act 4 in that Oxford was not the type of institu-
tion specified for their confinement.' In addition, one of the peti-
1. Federal Youth Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 865, 64 Stat. 1085 (1950), as amended
Pub. L. No. 90-226, 81 Stat. 734 (1967), Pub. L. No. 91-339, 84 Stat. 437 (1970), Pub. L
No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 231, 232 (1976) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970). See infrq
note 2. Petitioner Brown was convicted of possession of three unregistered destructive de-
vices (Molotov Cocktails), destruction by explosion of a planned parenthood clinic in De-
troit, Michigan, and causing personal injury to a doctor. Brown was twenty years old at
the time of conviction, and was sentenced to an eight year commitment. Petitioner Weaver,
who was twenty-three years old, was found guilty of armed bank robbery. Weaver was
sentenced to eight and one-half years of imprisonment. Petitioner Walls was also con-
fined under the Federal Youth Corrections Act and delivered to the Federal Correctional
Institute at Oxford, Wisconsin. Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 761-62 (W.D. Wis.
1977).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 5006(e) (1970) defines a youthful offender as a person under the age
of twenty-two at the time of conviction.
18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970) provides that a person between the ages of twenty-two and
twenty-six may, in the discretion of the court, be sentenced pursuant to the Youth Act.
18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970), Sentence, provides as follows:
(a) If the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need com-
mitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and, place
the youth offender on probation.
(b) If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and
the offense is punishable by i.mprisonment under applicable provisions of law
other than this subsection, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprison-
ment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the custody
of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to this Chap-
ter until discharged by the Division as provided in section 5017(c) of this
Chapter; or
(c) If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to de-
rive maximum benefit from treatment by the Division prior to the expiration.
of six years from the date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of im-
prisonment otherwise provided by law, sentence the youth offender to the
custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision pursuant to
this Chapter for any further period that may be authorized by law for the
offense or offenses of which he stands convicted or until discharged by the
Division as provided in section 5017(d) of this Chapter.
(d) If the court shall find that the youth offender will not derive benefit
from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the
youth offender under any other applicable penalty provision.
(e) If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth of-
fender will derive benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may
order that he be committed to the custody of the Attorney General for ob-
servation and study at an appropriate classification center or agency. Within
sixty days from the date of the order, or such additional period as the court
may grant, the Division shall report to the court its findings.
8. The Federal Correctional Institution, Oxford, Wisconsin, is a medium security young
adult Institution. The inmate population was made up of both youth offenders and adull
offenders. Generally, the inmates committed to Oxford are serving medium to long term
sentences. The ages of the inmates ranged from 21 to 28 years with an average of 24.98
years on May 5, 1976. Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 760 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
4. Id. at 758.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1970), Treatment, states as follows:
Committed youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo treat-
ment In institutions of maximum security, medium security, or minimum se-
curity types, including training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other
camps, and other agencies that will provide the essential varieties of treat-
ment. The Director shall from time to time) designate, set aside, and adopt
Institutions and agencies tinder the control of the Department of Justice for
treatment. Insofar as prcfc;al, such institutions and agencies shall be used
for treatment of committed youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall
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tioners contended that he was not sent to a classification center for
offenders as required by the Youth Act., The issues before the
court were as follows: (1) whether a Youth Act offender must be
the subject of special classification procedures; and (2) whether,
once it had been determined through the classification procedures
that he is to be physically confined', the Youth Act offender must be
segregated from non-Youth Act offenders for treatment.7 The United
States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held
that insofar as classification procedures are concerned, the intention
of the Youth Act was to provide separate and distinct procedures for
Youth Act and non-Youth Act offenders" and that the Bureau of
Prisons does not have complete discretion in designating the place
of confinement for individuals sentenced under the Youth Act because
the Youth Act requires that youth offenders be segregated from other
offenders.9 Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
In 1950 Congress enacted the Federal Youth Corrections Act,
which provided a system for the treatment and reh'abilitation of youth
offenders separate from that for other offenders. 10 The studies at that
be segregated from other offenders, and classes of committed youth offenders
.shall be segregated according to their needs for treatment.
(Emphasis added).
6. Brown v. Carlson, 431 F. Supp. 755, 758 (W.D. Wis. 1977). 18 U.S.C. § 5014 (1970),
Classification Studies and Reports, states as follows:
The Director shall provide classification centers and agencies. Every com-
mitted youth offender shall first be sent to a classification center or agency.
The classification center or agency shall make a complete study of each
committed youth offender, including a mental and physical examination, to
ascertain his personal traits, his capabilities, pertinent circumstances of his
school, family life, any previous delinquency or criminal experience, and' any
mental or physical defect or other factor contributing to his delinquency. In
the absence of exceptional circumstances, such study shall be completed with-
in a period of thirty days. The agency shaJI promptly forward to the Director
and to the Division a report of its findings with respect to the youth of-
fender an.T its recommendations as to his treatment. At least one member
of the Division or an examiner designated by the Division, shall, as soon as
practicable after commitment, interview the youth offender, review all re-
ports concerning him, and make such recommendations to the Director and
to the Division as may be indicated.
Classification procedures are carried out at Oxford and not a separate center as required
by § 5014. Upon arrival at Oxford, new inmates are placed in an admission and orienta-
tion program for approximately three weeks. The new inmates are given physical and
dental examinations, and undergo educational and psychological testing. At the conclu-
sion of the admission and orientation session the inmates are assigned to work details,
treatment programs, and housing units. There is no distinction made between Youth Act
and non-Youth Act offenders in the course of the admission, orientation, and assignment
procedure. 431 F. Supp. at 760-61.
7. 431 F. Supp. at 768.
S. See supra note 6. The court pointed out that the record revealed no compliance with
§ 5014, except that the Bureau of Prisons had decided to designate twelve Institutions In
the prison system as the initial place of confinement, where the classification process would
take place. 431 F. Supp. a.t 768.
9. Id. at 770. The court concluded that since the Youth Act was not complied with the
petitioners should be released unless they are confined to institutions housing only youth
offenders. Id. at 773.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 5005-5026 (Iq70). Sce S. l..p. No. 11S0, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-l
(1949) and also H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-10 (1950), reprinted in [1955]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NFws 3983-93. The enactment of the Youth Act came nine years
after a committee of the .Tidi~ial Conference of the United States began a, study on the
general sibiect of criminal puishment. A subcommiittee gave particular attention to the
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time indicated that the period of life between sixteen and twenty-three
years of age was the focal source of crime and that the young offend-
er's antisocial conduct was the result of special occurrences during
this period of life.11 It became apparent that existing methods of treat-
ment were only adding to the tendency toward antisocial behavior.
Placing the young offender, who was often very impressionable and
a novice to the criminal scene, with the more experienced and older
criminal resulted in very undesirable influences. The imprisoned
youth lacked the normal contacts with society that counteracted this
criminal influence, which resulted in prisons actually fostering crime
rather than checking it.12 The focus of the Act was on rehabilitation
as a substitute for retributive punishment.13
The model on which the Youth Act was based was the English
Borstal System. 14 The Borstal System is based upon a theory of seg-
regation of young and older offenders, with a special program of trade
instructions, drill, and a scheme of rewards and encouragements for
the youth offender's good conduct.1
5
The United States Supreme Court in Dorszynski v. United States6
has pointed out that the United States' version of the Borstal System
adopted by Congress provides for classification agencies to be estab-
lished by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to receive and study
the persons committed and to make recommendations to the Director
concerning appropriate treatment. 17 In addition, the Director is au-
thorized to adapt numerous public facilities to provide institutions for
treatment of offenders committed under the Youth Act.'8 An important
portion of the Youth Act provides that the offenders are to be segre-
punishment of youth offenders. It Is the findings and recommendations of this subcom-
mittee which are embodied in the Youth Act. Id. at 3984.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 3985. The belief at this period of time was that by placing youth offenders
with adult offenders, the youth offender was often released from prison In worse condi-
tion than when he went in. Id. at 3984-85.
13. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974). "The purpose of the proposed
legislation is to provide a new alternative sentencing and treatment procedure for youth
offenders." Id. at 437.
14. Id. at 432. See Prevention of Crime Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 59, §§ 1-19.
15. [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3987-89. The Borstal system was the result
of an 1894 English study that revealed that young prisoners between the ages of sixteen
and twenty-one came out of prisons in worse condition than when they went in, and that
the ma.4ority developed into habitual criminals between sixteen and twenty-one. Id. at 3987.
A wing at Bedford Prison was segregated and all youth offenders placed in that
wing. They were placed through a separate system of treatment programs than the adult
offender. A wing in the prison at Borstal was next set aside for the special handling of
offenders between sixteen and twenty-three. By the end of 1902, the entire institution at
Borstal was devoted to an intensive program for this age group. The program was one of
hard work and strict discipline, tempered by contrivances of reward, encouragement and
hope. -By 1950, the Borstal System Included thirteen institutions solely for the youth of-
fender, with each institution having its own specialty. Id.
The Borstal method of rehabilitation relies on the physical, physiological, and
social characteristics of youth which distinguish them from both children, and adults. It
is predicated upon the belief that the youth offender requires special corrective treatment
which is rehabilitative rather than retributive. Id.
16. 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
17. Id. at 434, citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 5014., 5015 (1970).
18. Id., citing 18 U.S.C. §, 5011. 5015 (1970).
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gated, insofar as practicable, so as to place them with those similarly
committed and to avoid the influences of more hardened criminals. 19
The issues in Brown20 were directed at these dual aspects of the
Youth Act recognized by the United States Supreme Court: classifica-
tion and segregation. 21
In Harvin v. United States,'2 the court interpreted the Youth Act
to preclude the commitment of a youth offender to a penitentiary.
23
The power of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to designate the
place of confinement for youth offenders was acknowledged,2 4 but
the court construed this power as being limited to agencies and in-
stitutions referred to in the Youth Act.2 5 This preclusion of youth of-
fenders from penitentiaries appears to be in line with the rehabilita-
tive motives of the Youth Act.2 6 The weight of case law, however,
appears to hold that youth offenders can be confined in penitentia-
ries. 2 7 In Foote v. United States, the defendant was sentenced under
19. 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1970). States which have enacted a youth authority act similar
to that of the Federal Youth Corrections Act are as follows: California, CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE §§ 1700-1904 (West 1972); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 242.01-.54 (West
1972) ; Texas, TEX. Juv. CODE ANN. tit. 82, § 5143d (Vernon 1971) ; Wisconsin, WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 54.01-.17 (West 1977).
20. 431 F. Supp. at 768.
21. 418 U.S. at 434.
22. 445 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
23. Id. at 680. But see United States v. Reef, 268 F. Supp. 1015 (D. Colo. 1967) where
the court states that the youth offender is to receive treatment and supervision, but the
Attorney General still has the sole power to designate the place of confinement, which
may be a penitentiary.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 5015 (1970), Powers of Director as to Placement of Youth Offenders,
provides as follows:
(a) On receipt of the report and recommendations from the classification
agency, the Director may
(1) recommend to the Division that the committed youth offender be
released conditionally under supervision : or
(2) allocate and direct the transfer of the committed youth offender to
an agency or institution for treatment' or
(3) order the committed youth offender confined and afforded treatment
under such conditions as he believes best designed for the protection
of the public.
(b) The Director may transfer at any time a committed youth offender
from one agency or institution to any other agency or institution.
25. 445 F.2d at 680-81. See supra note 5. 18 U.S.C. § 5012 (1970) requires the Director
to "certify that proper and adequate treatment facilities and personnel" are available
prior to the youth's commitment by the Attorney General.
26. 445 F.2d at 680-81. Penitentiary is defined as "a prison or place of punishment: the
place of punishment in which convicts sentenced to confinement and bard labor are con-
fined by the authority of the law." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1291 (4th ed. 1968).
In 1975, there were six sich federal penitentiaries located at Atlanta, Georgia,
Leavenworth, Kansas, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Marion, Illinois, McNeil Island, Steila-
coom, Washington, and Terre Haute, Indiana. In addition, there are twenty-two Institu-
tions classified as federal correctional institutions. Oxford, where the petitioners were
confined, is classified as one of the twenty-two federal correctional Institutions. FED. Bun.
PRISONs, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM FACILITIES 95 (2d ed. 1976).
27. Foote v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 627 (D. Nev. 1969). See Abernathy v. United
States, 418 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969) (petitioner tried to be released from Leavenworth
Penitentiary) ; Sonnenberg v. Markley, 289 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1961) (petitioner, sen-
tetnced under the Youth Act, petitioned for writ of habeas corpus to be released from
Terre Haute, Indiana, penitentiary) : Barr v. United States, 415 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (petitioner claimed that the Federal Correctional Institution in El Reno, Oklahoma,
was not the type of facility designated under the Youth Act) : Real v. United States, '58
F. Sunp. 235 (W.D. Ark. 195) (petitioner who was confined to Terre Haute, Indiana,
was denied relief even thouurh the Prison ,opulation was eighty percent adult offenders)
Coats v. Markley, 200 F. Supi. 6S6 (S.D. Ind. 1962) (court stated that 1S U.S.C.
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the Youth Act, and confined at the Marion Federal Penitentiary, Mar-
ion, Illinois. 2 The question in Foote was whether the Youth Act pro-
hibited the incarceration of youth offenders with hardened criminals.2 9
The court determined that the Attorney General has authority to desig-
nate the place of confinement"0 and that a youth offender may be con-
fined in a penitentiary under the provisions of the Youth Act.31
Brown v. Carlson32 recognized the broad authority of the Attorney
General to designate "any available, suitable, and appropriate insti-
tution or facility." 33 The court in Brown stated, however, that the
familiar rules of construction require that the authority given in an
earlier statute must be considered limited by the later enacted Youth
Act, which provided treatment for a particular group of offenders. 34
Statutory interpretation requires more than concentration on isolated
words. Consideration must be given to the law and policies behind a
provision. 5
The policy considerations behind the Youth Act were to provide
judges with an alternative method of sentencing young offenders,
a means by which the offender could be returned to function effective-
ly within society.36 The fifth circuit has recognized this policy in Cun-
ningham v. United States.3 7 The defendant in Cunningham was sen-
tenced under the Youth Act, which entailed a longer sentence than
if he had been sentenced as a regular adult. 38 The court in answering
the due process violation challenge of the defendant stated that the
5015(b) (1951) was intended to maintain the Attorney General's authority under 18 U.S.C.
I 4082 (1951)).
28. 306 F. Supp. 627 (D. Nev. 1969).
29. Id. at 628. See also 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1970), supra note 5.
30. 306 F. Supp. at 628. 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1970), Commitment to Attorney General,
provides, in part, as follows:
(a) A person convicted of an offense against the United States shall be
committed, for such term of imprisonment as the court may direct, to the
custody of the Attorney General of the United States, who shall designate
the place of confinement where the sentence shall be served.
(b) The Attorney General may designate as a place of confinement any
available, suitable, and appropriate institution or facility, whether maintained
by the Federal Government or otherwise, and whether within or without the
Judicial district in which the person was convicted, and may at any time
transfer a person from one place of confinement to another....
31. 306 F. Supp. at 628. See also 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1970), supra note 5.
32. 431 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1977).
93. Id. at 770. See also 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1970), supra note 30.
34. 431 F. Supp. at 770. "(T]he broad language of § 5015(a) and § 5011 must be con-
strued within the narrowing and interrelated provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections
Act which so clearly confines the Director's exercise of discretion as to choice of institu-
tions and choice of treatment." Id.
35. Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250 (1970).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1970). See S. REP. No. 1180, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-11
(1949) and also H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-10 (1950), reprinted in (1950J
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3983-93.
37. 256 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958).
38. Id. at 468-69. The defendant was convicted of theft on a government reservation.
The Item taken was valued at less than one hundred dollars; therefore, the crime was a
misdemeanor with a maximum sentence of one year. He was committed for treatment
and supervision under the Youth Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (1970). The defendant based his
motion to correct sentence on the ground that the sentence under the Youth Act of from
4-6 years was in excess of that authorized for the type of crime he was convicted of. Id.
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longer sentence under the Youth Act was permissible if it "affords
youthful offenders... not heavier penalties and punishment than are
imposed upon adult offenders, but the opportunity to escape from the
physical and psychological shocks and traumas attendant upon serving
an ordinary penal sentence. . .. ,"9 It is the rehabilitation theory or
promise to the youth offender which acts as the quid pro quo for the
longer confinement under conditions that are different from those
that would be experienced under a regular sentence. 40
Brown interprets the placement of youth offenders in the same
institution as adult offenders as being contradictory to this policy of
rehabilitation.41 The Brown court found that the present Bureau of
Prisons system of institutions for the housing of youth offenders was
inadequate and that these youth offenders must be segregated. 2
The Brown decision ultimately decides two areas of contention.
First, the court points out that the provision of the Youth Act provid-
ing for separate classification centers is not limited by a -saving clause
to the effect that there is to be segregation only insofar as practical.43
Therefore, the congressional intent was to provide for separate clas-
sification facilities for someone sentenced under the Youth Act.44 Sec-
ond, once the Youth Act offender has been classified, it was the con-
templation of Congress that he not be placed with adult offenders.48
Brown concludes that the words, "insofar as practical," were insert-
ed in the treatment provision to allow the Bureau of Prisons to house
youth offenders and adult offenders together only in unforeseen cir-
cumstances and for only the time necessary.46
39. 256 F.2d at 472. See State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949), which
upheld different treatment of different age groups under the Minnesota Youth Conserva-
tion Act. 1947 Minn. Laws, c. 595, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.125 (currently MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 242.01-54 (West 1972).
40. Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41. 431 F. Supp. at 766. The court states that "Congress has said rather bluntly that
offenders aged eighteen through twenty-five, sen.tenced by courts under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, are to be segregated from other offenders for purposes of classification
and treatment. The fact appears that the Bureau is not segregating them." Id.
42. Id. at 760. The present policy of the Federal Bureau of Prisons is that twelve in-
stitutions out of the fifty-six within the system will be designated for the confinement of
youth offfenders. In none of these institutions is the population solely made up of youth
offenders. At least twenty-seven percent of every institution population is composed of
adult offenders. At Oxford, only twelve percent of the inmates were serving sentences
under the Youth Act. Id.
43. 431 F. Supp. at 769. See 18 U.S.C. § 5014 (1970), supra note 6.
44. 431 F. Supp. at 769. Shortly after the Youth Act was enacted the Federal Bureau
of Prisons set aside two centers, at Ashland, Kentucky and Englewood, Colorado, which
were to be used as classification centers for 'Youth Act commitments. Id. at 768-69. How-
ever, not all classifications are done at these institutions. In the case of Petitioner Brown,
the classification was done at Oxford', not with the purpose of designation for another fa-
cility, but with the purpose of classification for programs at Oxford. Id. at 760-61, 773.
As the Brown opinion points out, this shows non-compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 5014 (1970),
in complete disregard of what Congress contemplated when the Youth Act was enacted.
Id. at 769.
45. See supra notes 12 & 13.
46. 431 F. Supp. at 773. The norm within the Federal Bureau of Prisons is to house
youth offenders with adult offenders. A necessary situation of unforeseen circumstances
does not appear to exist. The court raises the point that the words "insofar as practical"
In 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1970) may have been added to allow for a transition period im-
292
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The Brown court decided that the housing of petitioners at Ox-
ford was contradictory to the purpose of the Youth Act, and it con-
cluded that "within a universe consisting of all the institutions and
agencies housing all offenders sentenced to confinement by federal
courts, there was to be created and there is now to be maintained a
smaller universe" of all institutions housing only Youth Act offend-
ers .7
Although North Dakota does not have a statute calling for special
treatment of young offenders in the age group defined under the Youth
Act, the State has for many years recognized the special care re-
quired in the commitment of young offenders under the age of eight-
een.,, This belief in the 'separation of young offenders and adult
criminals and the need for separate facilities has been codified in
North Dakota. 49
mediately after the enactment of the Youth Act, but any need for a transition should be
alleviated after 27 years. The Brown court felt that special training programs may be an
example of when young and adult offenders may be housed together. The type of special
program that the court was considering was one in a particular skill and which the Bureau
desires to make available to both young and adult offenders, which, however, due to the
need for unusually expensive equipment and high salaried instructors, would be impractical
to offer In two programs. While it is only practical to offer the program at one institution,
and impracticable to segregate classes at the institution, it is mandatory that segregation
be done for all other purposes within the institution during the training program. Id. at
771-72.
47. Id.
48. State v. Overby, 54 N.D. 295, 209 N.W. 552 (1926). In the Overby case the North
Dakota Supreme Court pointed out that the ultimate effect of Comp. Laws 1913, § 11416
(Replaced by Uniform Juvenile Court Act, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-20-01 to 27-20-59
(1974 & Supp. 1977)) was to prevent children under the age of eighteen from being
placed into jails with hardened criminals.
The juvenile court is not a criminal court; and it is the purpose of the
law to treat Juvenile offenders under 18 years of age not as criminals,
but, as far as practicable, to give them the paternal care of the home, to
save them from the stigma attaching to crime, to guard and protect them
against themselves, and all evil-minded persons.
Id. at 302, 209 N.W. at 555.
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-44-23 (1976), Treatment of Juvenile Prisoners, provides as
follows:
Juvenile prisoners shall be treated in a manner calculated to promote their
reformation. They shall be kept, if the jail will admit of it, in apartments
separate from those containing more experienced and hardened criminals. The
visits of parents, guardians, and friends shall be permitted at all reasonable
times.
N.D. CENT. OODE § 27-20-16 (1974), Place ofDetention, provides in part as follows:
(1) A child alleged to be delinquent or unruly may be detained only in:
(a) A licensed foster home or a home apnroved by the court;
(b) A facility operated by a licensed child welfare agency;
(c) A detention home or center for delinquent or unruly children which
is under the direction or supervision of the court Or other public author-
ity or of a private agency approved by the court ; or
(d) Any other suitable place or facility, designated or operated by the
court. The child may be detained in a jail or other facility for the de-
tention of adults only if the facility in subdivision (c) is not available,
the detention is in a room separate and removed from those for adults,
it anpears to the satisfaction of the court or the juvenile supervisor that
public safety and protection reasonably require detention, and: it is so
ordered.
(2) The official in charge of a jail or other facility for the detention of adult
offenders or persons charged with crime shall inform the court immediately
if a person who is or apoears to be a child is received at the facility and shall
bring him before the court unon request or deliver him to a detention or
shelter care facility designated by the court. ...
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The decision in Brown is a radical change from the majority of
cases 50 and certainly presents a major administrative problem for
the Bureau of Prisons.5' However, the rehabilitation theory on which
the Youth Act is based calls for special treatment, and by housing and
training a youth offender with an adult offender, the Bureau of Prisons
has not met the quid pro quo of the rehabilitation theory that was
adopted in 1950.52
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LABOR RELATIONS-SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-THE GOOD FAITH
ISSUANCE OF INDIVIDUAL TEACHING CONTRACTS BY A SCHOOL BOARD
BEFORE THE COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS REQUIRED BY
STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE TEACHERS' REPRESENTATION AND NE-
GOTIATION ACT
Petitioner, Dickinson Education Association1 (D.E.A.), and Dick-
inson School District No. 1 (School Board) entered into contract
50. See supra note 27.
51. On October 27, 1977, there were 29,932 inmates confined within the federal prison
system. In May 1977, there were 2,400 male and 264 female, for a total of 2,664 youth
offenders in the system. This made up 9% of the total fe5eral prison population. In
order to comply with the ruling in Brownr, the Bureau of Prisons would be required to
physically move 7,000 plus inmates, involving 43 federal facilities housing youth offenders.
The actual costs are impossible to estimate when one considers the mass disruption of the
inmates involved. "While Brown was not a class action, its policy implications obviously
extend beyond the three individual plaintiffs involved. Accordingly, a Task Force of Bureau
of Prisons employees has been established to re-evaluate our present implementation of the
segregation provisions in Section 5011 of Title 18 of the United States Code." Letter from
Norman A. Carlson, Director of the Bureau of Prisons, to Paul F. Richard (November 1,
1977).
52. 431 F. Supp. at 766, 773.
1. In February of 1976 the Dickinson Education Association was recognized by the
Dickinson School Board as the exclusive bargaining agent of teachers within its school
system for the purpose of negotiating contracts on their behalf for the 1976-77 school term.
Dickinson Education Ass'n v. Dickinson Public School Dist. No. 1, 252 N.W.2d, 205, 208
(N.D. 1977).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-08 (1971), Right to Negotiate, states as follows: "Repre-
sentative organizations shall have the right to represent the appropriate negotiating unit
in matters of employee relations with the school board. Any teacher, or administrator,
shall have the right to present his view directly to the school board."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-09 (1971), Subject of Negotiations, states as follows: "Tie
scope of representation shall include matters relating to terms and conditions of employ-
ment and employer-employee relations, including, but not limited to salary, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-12 (1971), Good Faith Negotiations, states as follows: "1.
The school board, or its repiresentatives, and the representative organization, selected by the
appropriate negotiating unit, or its representatives, shall have the duty to meet at reason-
ailo times at the request of either party and to negotiate in good faith with respect to:
(a). Terms and conditions of employment and ernployer-employee relators .. "
The D.E.A., as exclusive bargaining agent, appealed the finding of the District Court
of Stark County, that the negotiations between it and the S,-hol Board complied with the
good faith reniuirernents of the applicable statutes. 252 N.V.2d 205 (N.D. 1977).
